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Research suggests that empathic concern and distress give rise to different patterns of 
helping behavior. It has been proposed that this difference is caused by the effects of 
these emotions on recurrent thoughts about the person in need. However, no research has 
directly investigated this potential explanation. To remedy this, we tested the hypotheses 
that distress, but not empathic concern, is associated with both anticipated recurring 
thoughts (Study 1) and experienced recurring thoughts (Study 2) about a victim. We also 
tested the hypothesis that distress is associated with thoughts about the victim, whereas 
empathic concern is associated with thoughts about the victim’s situation (Study 3), 
which is potentially a consequence of the motives associated with each emotion. Lastly, 
we assessed the causal relations between distress, empathic concern, and recurrent 
thoughts (Study 4). Overall, results demonstrate a distinctive, and important, pattern of 
associations among empathic concern, distress, and different forms of recurrent thoughts 
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Can’t get you out of my mind: Empathy, Distress, and Recurring Thoughts about a 
Person in Need 
Why is exposure to the suffering of another sometimes so easy to remember and 
yet, at other times, so easy to forget?  One possible answer is the nature of the emotional 
response that the suffering other elicits. Previous research suggests that witnessing a 
person in clear need can evoke at least two distinct emotional responses – empathic 
emotions and distress-related vicarious emotions (for a review, see Batson, 2011). It is 
important to note that these two emotional responses are not only logically distinct, but 
also empirically distinguishable. Coke and colleagues (1978) developed an Emotional 
Response Questionnaire (ERQ) to assess empathic concern and distress caused by 
exposure to a person in need. A number of factor analyses have been conducted on this 
scale to demonstrate qualitative difference between these two emotional responses (e.g., 
Batson et al., 1979; Batson et al., 1983; Batson et al., 2007; Coke, 1980; Coke et al., 
1978; Fultz, 1982; Toi & Batson, 1982). Also, dozens of experiments have demonstrated 
that vicarious distress and empathic concern have different motivational and behavioral 
consequences (for thorough reviews, see Batson, 2011; Dovidio, Pilliavin, Schroeder, & 
Penner, 2006).  
More recently, research in social neuroscience suggests that these two emotional 
responses to witnessing the suffering of others generate different patterns of neural 
activation (e.g., Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007).  Taken together, the evidence 
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demonstrates that distress is not simply a form of empathic concern (or vice versa). 
Before discussing the present research, it is important to clearly define what we mean by 
empathic concern and distress. 
Empathic emotions can be defined as "other-oriented emotional response[s] 
congruent with the perceived welfare of another person" (Batson et al. 1988, p. 52). The 
most commonly-studied form of empathic emotion is empathic concern, which is a 
situational emotional response to witnessing another person in clear need (Batson, 2001). 
According to the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis, empathy evokes an altruistic motive to 
benefit the suffering person rather than an egoistic motive to benefit oneself (Batson, 
Bolen, Cross, & Neuringer-Benefield, 1986). For example, in a series of experiments in 
which participants observed a student experience a negative reaction to receiving electric 
shocks, empathically-aroused participants were more likely to take shocks on her behalf 
than were participants feeling relatively low levels of empathic concern (Batson & Coke, 
1981; Batson et al., 1986).  
In contrast, distress-related vicarious emotions can also be elicited by witnessing 
another person in need. Such emotions are assumed to elicit concern for one's own 
welfare or comfort rather than concern for the suffering person who elicited this negative 
feeling state (Batson & Coke, 1981). Distress has been shown to motivate individuals to 
engage in actions that result in escape from the eliciting target (Piliavin, Dovidio, 
Gaertner, & Clark, 1981) or that otherwise reduce the negative affective state evoked by 
witnessing another person suffer (Cialdini & Kenrick, 1976). For example, in the shock 
experiments described above, participants experiencing distress typically refused to take 
any shocks for the victim, so long as it was easy to avoid exposure to the victim (Batson, 
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O’Quin, Fultz, Vanderplas, & Isen, 1983). These same experiments, however, 
demonstrated that when participants were unable to avoid exposure to the victim, 
personal distress led to helping behavior.  
Empathic Concern, Personal Distress, and Escaping Awareness of the Victim 
Although the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis does not make any claims about 
mental content that may be associated with empathic concern, the research designs used 
to test it are based on the assumption that empathic arousal does not promote recurring 
thoughts about the victim or the victim’s situation. Hoffman (1981, 1991) and Hornstein 
(1991) argued that this assumption is both untested and unwarranted. Specifically, they 
pointed out that Batson and colleagues’ most compelling evidence for the empathy-
altruism hypothesis relies on experiments in which ease of avoiding continued exposure 
to the victim was used to differentiate altruistic motives (protecting another’s welfare) 
from egoistic motives (reducing one’s own aversive arousal). But does discontinuing 
direct contact with the empathy-inducing victim cause the observer to stop thinking about 
him or her? A number of researchers think not (e.g., Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 
1996; Hoffman, 1991; Hornstein, 1991; Maner et al., 2002; Stocks, Lishner, & Decker, 
2009).  
Hornstein (1991) suggests, instead, that empathic concern actually “increases 
observers’ cognizance of another’s plight” (p. 134). Regarding evidence that Batson and 
colleagues have amassed in support of the empathy-altruism hypothesis, Hoffman (1991) 
noted that: 
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The findings fit Batson’s prediction. But I do not believe they justify his 
conclusion that they demonstrate altruistic behavior . . . The major problem is one 
of design. Namely, the “easy escape” condition may not actually provide an easy 
escape for the high-empathy subjects because these subjects were adults who are 
capable of cognitively representing events. Being able to represent events, they 
must be credited with the capacity to respond emotionally when they know 
someone is suffering, even though they are not directly witnessing the suffering . . 
. Leaving the situation may not be an easy way out if one retains a vivid mental 
representation of the suffering victim (pp. 131-132). 
It is possible that empathically-aroused participants in Batson and colleagues’ studies 
helped simply because empathic concern causes recurring thoughts about the victim. If 
this is the case, then leaving the situation does not allow participants to achieve an 
egoistic goal of reducing the unpleasant arousal caused by exposure to the suffering 
person.  
To test the claim that empathically-aroused participants help because they are 
unable to psychologically escape thoughts about the victim, Stocks and colleagues (2009) 
directly manipulated the ease of psychologically escaping awareness of a victim’s 
suffering through the use of two memory-altering manipulations. Specifically, in Study 1 
Stocks and colleagues manipulated the likelihood of recurring thoughts about a person in 
clear need using a hypnosis manipulation that would (ostensibly) permanently implant or 
permanently delete memories about the victim stimulus.  In a follow-up study, the 
likelihood of recurring thoughts about the other in need was manipulated with 
information about how likely it is to forget victim-relevant information. The results of 
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these studies were consistent with Batson and colleagues’ findings – empathically-
aroused participants helped to a greater degree than participants experiencing little or no 
empathy, even when they were convinced that they would not have recurring thoughts 
about the victim.  
Cognitive Consequences of Vicarious Emotions 
The critique of research on the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis noted above 
suggests a topic of inquiry that is larger, and of more broad interest, than helping 
behaviour research per se – that vicarious emotional reactions to events in the life of 
another person can have important cognitive consequences. These consequences may 
include anticipated, or experienced, recurring thoughts about the person who elicited 
those emotional reactions. If this claim has merit, which of the vicarious emotions 
produces this consequence? And, how does this process operate? 
Although to our knowledge no research has directly investigated the relationship 
between vicarious emotions and recurring thoughts about the eliciting stimulus, a related 
line of research on self-rumination suggests that intrusive thoughts about oneself may 
impede intrapersonal and interpersonal functioning, and are linked with both depression 
(Ingram & Smith, 1984) and neuroticism (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). In a similar vein, 
Joireman, Parrott, and Hammersla (2002) found that empathy was positively related to 
self-reflection, whereas personal distress was positively related to self-rumination. It is 
important to note, however, that (a) research on rumination described above 
conceptualizes empathy and distress as personality traits rather than as situational 
emotional responses to events in the lives of others, and (b) the purpose of that research is 
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to assess rumination about self rather than recurring thoughts about another person.  
Consequently, the literature on self-rumination does not directly address the topic at hand 
– situational vicarious emotions and how they relate to recurring thoughts about another 
person. 
Another important difference between existing research and the present research 
involves the manner in which recurring thoughts is assessed. Logically, there are at least 
two types of possible thoughts about another person in need. First, one may anticipate 
that he or she will continue to think about the other person or the person’s situation. This 
form of thought is at the heart of the critique of Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis research 
noted above. Second, one may actually experience recurring thoughts over a period of 
time – that is, continued thoughts about the person after exposure to him or her has 
ended. It is important to note that anticipated recurring thoughts may or may not yield 
experienced recurring thoughts. For example, a person may expect that he or she will be 
unable to forget a certain stimulus, only to later realize that the stimulus never actually 
came to mind again. Or, one may not expect to think about a certain stimulus at all, yet 
intrusive thoughts nonetheless occur for a long period of time. The aim of our research is 
to study the relationship between situational vicarious emotions (i.e., emotions elicited by 
exposure to the other person), and both anticipated and experienced recurring thoughts 
about the eliciting person or the person’s situation. Studying both forms of thought is 
important not only for researchers attempting to understand how vicarious emotions 
relate to prosocial motives and behaviour, but also for researchers attempting to better 
understand cognitive consequences of vicarious emotional responding in general. 
Hypotheses and Overview of Present Research 
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In an effort to better understand the relationships between empathic concern, 
distress, and recurring thoughts, we conducted a series of studies to test the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: Distress (but not empathic concern) is associated with anticipated 
recurring thoughts about the victim. We tested this hypothesis in Study 1 by exposing 
participants to a victim in clear need, measuring situational empathic concern and 
distress, as well as the extent to which they anticipated thinking about the victim in the 
future. Although inspired by the critique of research on the Empathy-Altruism 
Hypothesis noted above (i.e., that empathic concern causes recurring thoughts about the 
victim), we predict the opposite outcome for two reasons.   
First, there is no evidence to support the claim that empathy does, in fact, 
influence recurring thoughts at all. The critiques of the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis 
that inspired our line of research were speculation, and no published studies have directly 
tested those claims. Second, our predictions stem largely from Stocks and colleagues’ 
(2009) finding that manipulating thoughts about the victim did not eliminate the 
association between empathic concern and helping. This suggests that recurring thoughts 
were not a causal factor in the empathic concern-helping relationship. This manipulation 
did, however, substantially reduce the association between personal distress and helping, 
which suggests that recurring thoughts may be an important moderator of this 
relationship. Hypothesis 1 is also conceptually consistent with Joireman and colleagues’ 
(2002) finding that distress, but not empathy, is associated  with another form of 
recurring thoughts --  self-rumination. Although Joireman and colleagues’ research 
involves dispositional (rather than situational) empathy and distress, as well as self-
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rumination rather than recurring thoughts about another person, we believe that these two 
phenomena likely operate via similar mechanisms, albeit with different content.     
Hypothesis 2: Distress (but not empathic concern) is associated with experienced 
recurring thoughts about the victim. We tested this hypothesis in Study 2 by having 
participants return to the laboratory two days after exposure to the victim to report the 
number of times they thought about the victim during that two-day period. The logic 
behind this hypothesis is the same as Hypothesis 1. Study 2 also afforded a second test of 
Hypothesis 1 with a different scenario and presentation modality, which offers an 
assessment of the generalizability of this phenomenon to a different victim and need 
situation. 
Hypothesis 3: Distress is associated with anticipated and experienced recurring 
thoughts about the victim (but not the victim’s situation), whereas empathic concern is 
associated with anticipated and experienced recurring thoughts about the victim’s 
situation (but not about the victim). We tested this hypothesis in Study 3 by using the 
victim stimulus from Study 1, combined with the thought-assessment procedures from 
Study 2. The primary difference in the procedure of Study 3 is that participants were 
asked to report the focus of their thoughts – that is, thoughts about the victim versus 
thoughts about the victim’s situation.  
The rationale for this hypothesis stems from research on two different topic areas. 
The first involves research on the One-Among-Others Effect (e.g., Oceja, Ambrona, 
López-Pérez, Salgado, & Villegas, 2010; Oceja, Heerdink, Stocks, López-Pérez, & 
Salgado, 2014; Oceja, Stocks, & Lishner, 2010). This research demonstrates that 
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observers can focus on either (a) a specific victim, or (b) the victim’s need situation, 
especially when multiple victims are affected by a similar need. The likelihood of 
offering help increases with congruence between the beneficiary of help (the specific 
individual vs. multiple individuals with the same need) and the focus of attention that 
generated empathic emotions for the victim in the first place (the victim vs. the victim’s 
need situation).  Or, to put this more simply, people are more likely to help when the 
opportunity to help will benefit the emotion-eliciting stimulus (e.g., multiple people 
suffering a specific need) rather than a related, but different stimulus (e.g., a specific 
individual suffering from that need). Although that line of research does not report the 
association between empathic concern, distress, and observers’ focus of attention, it does 
suggests that observers have the ability to focus on either a victim or the victim’s 
situation, and that this focus of attention has important behavioural consequences.  
The second research area of relevance to this hypothesis is on the different 
motives associated with empathic concern and distress (for thorough reviews, see Batson, 
2011; Dovidio et al., 2006). Dozens of studies have found that empathic concern is 
associated with a motive to help the victim. In order to help the victim, it is necessary to 
understand the victim’s situation and to consider appropriate actions that will remedy it 
(e.g., Latane & Darley, 1968). Consistent with this reasoning, Batson and colleagues 
(1988, Study 5) used a Stroop Task to determine the content of thoughts among 
participants experiencing high versus low empathic concern, and the relationship between 
these thoughts and helping behaviour. They found that empathic concern was associated 
with increased latency when responding to words relevant to the victim’s need, which 
indicates that this mental content was present. The increased latency of need-situation 
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thoughts was positively associated with helping behaviour. This suggests that the need 
situation of the victim was on the minds of empathically-aroused participants, but not on 
the minds of participants experiencing relatively low levels of empathy. Unfortunately, 
the relation between empathic concern and thoughts about the victim per se, and the 
relation between distress and any type of mental content, were not reported in this 
research.   
It is important to note, however, that other research has demonstrated an 
association between distress and a desire to escape the source of aversive arousal. In most 
cases, the source of aversive arousal is the suffering victim, and the goal is to either halt 
current exposure to the victim or to avoid future exposure to the victim (Dovidio et al., 
2006). This argument is at the core of the Arousal/Cost Reward Model of helping 
behaviour, which has found empirical support in numerous studies. If this model is 
accurate, experiencing distress is likely associated with mental content related to the 
stimulus to be escaped – the victim. We are not aware of any existing research directly 
testing the association between distress and mental content associated with a victim or the 
victim’s situation. Accordingly, Study 3 is an attempt to address this important gap in the 
literature.   
Study 4 employed an essay-writing task to directly manipulate emotional response 
(empathic concern vs. distress) in order to assess the causal relations between these two 
emotions and recurring thoughts about the victim or the victim’s situation. The victim 
scenario in Study 4 was the same as was used in Studies 1 and 3, and the thought-
assessment procedure was the same as was used in Study 3. This configuration afforded 
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us a second opportunity to test Hypothesis 3 regarding the relation between empathic 
concern, distress, and the focus of recurring thoughts.  
We also included an Affect Grid (Russel, Weiss, & Mendhelson, 1989) in Study 4 
to measure the valence and intensity of participants’ emotional responses so that we 
might better understand the patterns of association between empathic concern, distress, 
and recurring thoughts. The purpose of including a measure of valence and intensity was 
largely exploratory, and we make no a priori predictions about this measure. However, it 
is possible that empathic concern and distress differ in valence or intensity, and it is this 
difference – rather than the type of vicarious emotion per se – that produces the patterns 
of recurring thoughts reported here (cf. Feldman-Barrett, & Russel, 1998; López-Pérez, 
Carrera, Ambrona, & Oceja, 2014). Taken together, these four studies constitute an 
important first step toward better understanding the role of empathy- and distress-related 
emotions in recurring thoughts about another person.  
Study 1: Empathic Concern, Distress, and Anticipated Recurring Thoughts 
Method 
 The purpose of Study 1is to test the hypothesis that distress, but not empathic 
concern, is associated with anticipated recurring thoughts about the victim.  
Participants. Eighty participants (60 Female) from a Southwestern university in 
the United States participated in this study in exchange for extra credit (age ranged from 
18 to 42, M = 21.29, SD = 3.02).  
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Procedure and Measures. Participants were schedule in a single group session 
lasting approximately 15 minutes. Participants were asked to read and sign an informed 
consent document, after which an audio-taped introduction and cover story were 
presented. The audio-taped introduction described the study as an attempt to understand 
people’s memory for different types of news reports. After listening to the cover story, 
participants were given an (ostensibly real) newspaper article to read. Participants were 
led to believe that there were a number of different newspaper articles being used in the 
study. In reality, however, every participant read the same article. This article that all 
participants read described Jane Seiber, a young woman undergoing treatment for 
myeloid leukemia.  
After reading the article, participants completed an the Emotional Response 
Questionnaire (ERQ) that contained emotion adjectives to assess empathic concern 
(compassionate, moved, sympathetic, softhearted, tender, and warm) and distress (upset, 
worried, grieved, disturbed, distressed, and troubled), as well as a number of filler 
adjectives, each rated on a 1 (Not at All) to 7 (Very Much) Likert scale. These emotion 
terms were combined to form indexes of empathic concern (Cronbach’s α = .88) and 
distress (Cronbach’s α = .89). This approach to assessing empathic concern and distress 
was developed Batson and colleagues, and a number of factor analyses have been 
conducted to demonstrate the qualitative difference between these emotional states (e.g., 
Batson et al., 1979; Batson et al., 1983; Batson et al., 2007; Coke, 1980; Coke et al., 
1978; Lopez-Perez et al., 2014; Toi & Batson, 1982).1  
Participants then completed a second questionnaire that, in addition to a number 
of filler items, contained two items to assess anticipated recurring thoughts. These items 
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were “To what extent do you anticipate thinking about the article you read during the 
next 15 minutes?” and “To what extent do you anticipate thinking about the article you 
read during the next 60 minutes?” each rated on a 1 (Not at all) to 9 (Very Much) Likert 
scale. After participants completed these measures, a full debriefing was conducted. 
Participants were informed that the victim stimulus was a fabrication developed for use in 
the study. 
Results and Discussion 
 There were no significant effects of gender on any key dependent variables, so 
this factor will not be discussed further.2 Overall, participants reported feeling more 
empathic concern (M = 4.31, SD = 1.25) than distress (M = 3.14, SD = 1.48) for the 
victim, t (79) = 8.87, p < .001.3 Also, the extent to which participants anticipated having 
recurring thoughts about the stimulus during the next 15 minutes (M = 4.63, SD = 2.35) 
and 60 minutes (M= 3.66, SD = 2.55) were close to the midpoint of their respective 9-
point scales. Thus, the results reported below cannot be attributed to ceiling or floor 
effects on the primary dependent variables.  
 Due to significant overlap between the empathic concern and distress indices, r 
(78) = .64, p < .001, partial correlations were employed to assess the unique association 
of empathic concern and distress with anticipated recurring thoughts.  Empathic concern, 
controlling for distress, was not significantly correlated with anticipated recurring 
thoughts during the 15-minute period [r (78) = .01, p = ns] or the 60-minute period [r 
(78) = .01, p = ns].  In contrast, distress, controlling for empathic concern, was 
significantly correlated with anticipated recurring thoughts during the 15-minute period [r 
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(78) = .26, p = .02] and 60-minute period [r (78) = .27, p = .01].  The two anticipated 
thought items were correlated, r (78) = .81, p < .001.  See Table 1 for more details. 
Study 2: Empathic Concern, Distress, and Experienced Recurring Thoughts 
The results of Study 1 suggest two things. First, emotions elicited by a person in 
need are, indeed, associated with anticipated recurring thoughts about that person. 
Second, it is distress, rather than empathy, that was associated with recurring thoughts 
about the victim. This supports our Hypothesis 1.  
In order to further test our hypotheses, we conceptually replicated Study 1 with 
several important changes to the procedure. First, we extended the timeframe of 
anticipated recurring thoughts to 48 hours. Second, participants returned to the lab 48 
hours after exposure to the victim and we measured the amount of recurring thoughts 
they actually experienced during that two-day period. Third, we changed the victim (an 
older male vs. a younger female) and need situation (homelessness vs. a disease). Fourth, 
we used a different presentation modality (audio vs. text). These purpose of changing the 
victim, need situation, and modality was to assess the generalizability of the pattern of 
results from Study 1. We predict that distress, but not empathic concern, will be 
associated with anticipated recurring thoughts about the victim (Hypothesis 1). We also 
predict that distress, but not empathic concern, will be associated with experienced 
recurring thoughts about the victim (Hypothesis 2). 
Method 
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Participants.  Sixty freshman students (39 Females) from a Midwestern 
university in the United States participated in Study 2 in exchange for extra credit (age 
ranged from 18 to 28, M = 19.65, SD = 1.63).   
Procedure and Measures. Participants were run through the procedure in several 
large group sessions.  Upon arrival, participants were asked to read a written introduction 
to the study, then to read and sign an informed consent statement.  The written 
introduction explained that participants would listen to a brief radio broadcast and report 
their attitudes about the broadcast. The audio clip that participants heard after reading the 
introduction to the study depicted an interview with Harold Mitchell, a homeless man, 
describing his struggles.  In reality, the clip was created for use in research, and the script 
was read by an actor.   
After listening to the audio clip, participants completed a series of questionnaires.  
The first questionnaire contained the ERQ used in Study 1 to calculate empathic concern 
(Cronbach’s α = .89) and distress (Cronbach’s α = .92) indices.  The second questionnaire 
contained several items consistent with the cover story and an item to assess how 
frequently participants expected to think about the person in the audio segment over the 
next two days, rated on a 5-point Likert scale (0 = 0 times; 1 = 1-3 times; 2 = 4-6 times; 3 
= 7-10 times; 4 = 11-13 times; 5 = 14 or more times).  During a second session 48 hours 
later, participants completed a questionnaire that contained a similar item to assess how 
frequently participants thought about the person in the audio clip during the previous 48 
hours, using the scale described above. Responses from the first set of questionnaires 
were matched to the second questionnaire using a participant-generated code number. A 
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full debriefing was conducted after the second session, and participants were informed 
that the victim stimulus was fabricated for use in the study. 
Results and Discussion 
 Due to the significant overlap between the empathic concern and distress, r (58) = 
.70, p < .001, partial correlations were employed to assess the unique association of these 
emotions with both anticipated and experienced recurring thoughts.  Empathic concern, 
controlling for distress, was not significantly correlated with either anticipated [r (58) = -
.05, p = .73] or experienced [r (58) = -.16, p = .22] recurring thoughts about the victim.  
Distress, controlling for empathic concern, was significantly correlated with both 
anticipated [r (58) = .29, p = .03] and experienced [r (58) = .31, p = .02] recurring 
thoughts about the victim.  Anticipated and experienced recurring thoughts were also 
significantly correlated, r (58) = .43, p < .001. See Table 1 for more details. 
Study 3: Anticipated Recurring Thoughts about the Person and the Situation 
 The results of Studies 1 and 2 reveal an interesting pattern of associations 
between empathic concern, distress, and recurring thoughts about the victim stimulus. 
Distress was associated with anticipated and experienced recurring thoughts about the 
victim, whereas empathic concern was not. This supports our Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
However, we did not directly investigate the focus of recurring thoughts in those two 
studies.  
As noted above, it is possible to focus on either the victim or the victim’s situation 
(cf., Oceja et al., 2010). It is also possible that empathic concern and distress are 
associated with different foci of recurring thoughts. The purpose of Study 3 is to clarify 
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the association between these different emotional responses and foci of these thoughts. 
Specifically, we test the hypothesis that distress is associated with anticipated and 
experienced recurring thoughts about the victim, whereas empathic concern is associated 
with anticipated and experienced recurring thoughts about the victim’s situation 
(Hypothesis 3). 
Method 
Participants. Forty-four freshman students (32 Females) from a Midwestern 
university in the United States participated in this study in exchange for extra credit (age 
ranged from 18 to 48, M = 21.93, SD = 6.42). 
Procedure and Measures. The procedure for this experiment was identical to the 
one used in Experiment 1 (Sick Jane), aside from one important change: We asked 
participants about two different forms of thought. Specifically, the first question asked, 
“To what extent to do you anticipate thinking about Jane during the next 60 minutes? 
The second asked, “To what extent do you anticipate thinking about Jane’s situation 
during the next 60 minutes?” Both items were rated on a 9-point Likert scale (1 = Not at 
all; 9 = Very much). The purpose of including these two items was to investigate the 
focus of recurring thought (the victim vs. the victim’s situation) that may be associated 
with empathic concern and distress. The ERQ used in Study 3 to derive the empathic 
concern (Cronbach’s α = .90) and distress (Cronbach’s α = .89) indices was the same as 
in Studies 1 and 2. A full debriefing was conducted after participants completed these 
questionnaires.  
Results and Discussion 
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 Due to the significant overlap between the empathic concern and distress indices, 
r (42) = .71, p < .001, partial correlations were again employed.  Empathic concern, 
controlling for distress, was significantly correlated with anticipated recurring thoughts 
about the situation, r (42) = .47, p = .002. Empathic concern, controlling for distress, was 
not significantly correlated with recurring thoughts about the person, r (42) = .24, p = 
.11.  
Distress followed the opposite pattern. Distress, controlling for empathic concern, 
was significantly correlated with anticipated recurring thoughts about the person, r (42) = 
.44, p = .003. Distress, controlling for empathic concern, was not significantly correlated 
with recurring thoughts about the situation, r (42) = .03, p = .83. Thus, empathic concern 
was primarily associated with anticipated recurring thoughts about the situation, whereas 
distress was primarily associated with anticipated recurring thoughts about the victim. 
These results supported Hypothesis 3. See Table 2 for more details. 
Study 4: Causal Relations between Distress, Empathic Concern, and Recurring 
Thoughts 
 The studies reported above support our three hypotheses. However, all three of 
these studies are correlational, so claims about the causal relations among empathic 
concern, distress, and recurring thoughts have yet to be addressed. The purpose of Study 
4 is to directly manipulate empathic concern and distress in order to assess the causal 
relations between these emotions and the two foci of recurring thoughts discussed above 
(focus on the person vs. focus on the person’s situation). This study design also allows us 
to further test Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3. 
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Method 
Participants. Fifty undergraduate students (31 Females) from a Southwestern 
university in the United States participated in exchange for course extra credit (age 
ranged from 18 to 45, M = 20.26, SD = 4.56). It was necessary to exclude and replace one 
participant from the Empathic Concern Condition because she failed to complete the 
follow-up questionnaire. 
Procedure and Measures. Participants were scheduled and run individually 
through a procedure that lasted approximately 20 minutes. Upon arrival at the laboratory, 
participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (Distress vs. Empathic 
Concern) and ushered to a private room. A computerized presentation explained that the 
study concerns how writing essays influences the way people read and remember essays 
written by other people. The description explained that participants would write a brief 
essay, read an essay written by another person, and then complete questionnaires about 
the essay they read.  Participants were also asked to create a unique, anonymous 
identification number that they would use when they returned to complete a second 
research session two days later. The research assistant answered any questions the 
participant had, then left the participant to complete the study materials, all of which were 
presented via computer. 
 Distress Condition. Participant randomly assigned to the Distress Condition were 
presented with the following instructions via computer: 
On the piece of paper in front of you, please write about a recent experience in 
your life that caused you to feel distress or anxiety for someone else. Try to relive 
the experience and feel that emotion again. 
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A timer automatically sounded after 5 minutes to alert participants to stop writing. The 
computer then directed participants to read a brief essay located in a folder on the desk. 
The purpose of this sequence was to create feelings of distress that would carry-over to 
the content of the essay that participants read immediately afterward. This emotion-
transfer procedure for manipulating emotions has been used in several previous 
experiments to induce concrete emotions (e.g., Damasio et al., 2000; Gemar, Kapur, 
Segal, Brown & Houle, 1996; Salovey, 1992). The essay participants read was identical 
to the one used in Studies 1 and 3 (Sick Jane). The remainder of the procedure was 
identical for all participants.  
Empathic Concern Condition. For participants randomly assigned to the 
Empathic Concern Condition, the instructions for writing the essay were the same as 
those described above, except that the phrase, “distress or anxiety” was replaced with the 
phrase “empathy, sympathy, or compassion.”   Participants in both conditions then 
completed modified versions of the questionnaires that were used in Study 3. 
Specifically, participants first completed the ERQ that contained the same empathic 
concern (Cronbach’s α = .85) and distress (Cronbach’s α = .87) emotion adjectives used 
in the previous studies. The instructions on this questionnaire made it clear to participants 
that they were to report emotions felt for the person depicted in the essay they read, rather 
than what they experienced while writing their own essay.  
Participants then completed an affect grid questionnaire (Russell et al.,  1989) in 
order to assess the valence (Extremely Pleasant to Extremely Unpleasant) and intensity 
(Extremely High Arousal to Extremely Low Arousal) of their emotional responses to the 
essay they read. This affect grid assessed their emotional response to the victim essay, 
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regardless of which emotion-inducing essay they completed earlier in the procedure. 
Lastly, participant completed a questionnaire that contained three thought items 
(recurring thoughts in general, about the victim, and about the victim’s situation), as well 
as several filler and demographic items. The three recurring thought items were each 
rated on a 9-point Likert scale (1 = Not at all; 9 = Very much).  
Once the participant completed all of the questionnaires, the research assistant 
returned and gave participants a form that contained a link to the online follow-up 
questionnaire, as well as the date and time (48 hours after participation) at which 
participants were expected to log in to complete the follow-up questionnaire. In order to 
encourage response rate on the follow-up questionnaire, (a) the online participant 
recruiting software we use to schedule participants automatically sent a reminder email 
on the morning that the follow-up questionnaire was to be completed, and (b) the 
recruiting software did not apply credit for participating in the study until after 
participants logged in to complete the follow-up questionnaire. As noted above, all but 
one participant completed the follow-up questionnaire. A full debriefing was conducted 
online once participants submitted their follow-up questionnaire. 
Results and Discussion 
 Essay-writing manipulation check. Participants assigned to the Distress 
Condition reported more distress (M = 3.88, SD = 2.16) than did participants assigned to 
the Empathic Concern Condition (M = 2.66, SD = 1.80), t (48) = 2.17, p < .04. Likewise, 
participants assigned to the Empathic Concern Condition experienced more empathy (M 
= 5.79, SD = 2.48) than did participants assigned to the Distress Condition (M = 4.75, SD 
= 1.69), although this effect was not statistically significant, t (48) = 1.73, p = .09. Thus, 
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the essay-writing manipulation successfully produced two groups of participants – one 
with a relatively low level of distress and one with a relatively high level of distress. 
 Valence and arousal. The results from the affect grid measure suggest no 
significant differences in reported valence between participants in the Distress Condition 
(M = -.40, SD = 1.80) and Empathic Concern Condition (M = -.76, SD = 2.11), or in 
reported arousal between the two conditions (M = -.28, SD = 2.07; M = -.08, SD = 1.99, 
respectively), both ts < .65, ps > .51. Consequently, differences in recurring thought 
across condition cannot be attributed to a simple valence or arousal effect. 
 Anticipated and experienced recurring thoughts. Participants reported the 
extent to which they expected to think about the essay they read in general, to think about 
the person, and to think about the situation described in the essay during the next 48 
hours. Participants also completed a follow-up questionnaire 48 hours after exposure to 
the emotion-inducing stimulus materials. In order to avoid type II error due to having 
participants answer to the same questions twice, we ran a repeated-measures ANOVA for 
each thought question (i.e., general vs. person vs. situation). For recurring thoughts in 
general, the results indicate an effect of condition, F (1, 48) = 12.31, p < .001, such that 
participant in the Distress Condition (M = 4.02, SD = 2.04) reported significantly more 
recurring thoughts at both times than did participants in the Empathic Concern Condition 
(M = 2.58, SD = 2.24). For recurring thoughts about the person, the results indicate an 
effect of condition, F (1, 48) = 12.02, p = .001, such that participants in the Distress 
Condition (M = 3.88, SD = 1.83) reported significantly more recurring thoughts about the 
person at both times than did participants in the Empathic Concern Condition (M = 2.40, 
SD = 1.61). For recurring thoughts about the situation, the results indicate an effect of 
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condition, F (1, 48) = 29.99, p = .001, such that participants in the Empathic Concern 
Condition (M = 2.90, SD = 1.10) reported significantly more recurring thoughts about the 
situation at both times than did participants in the Distress condition (M = 2.64, SD = 
1.38). 
In order to more directly test our hypotheses, we also conducted a series of t-tests 
on the different anticipated and experienced recurring thought measures. The results for 
anticipated recurring thoughts suggest that participants assigned to the Distress Condition 
expected to think more about the essay in general (M = 4.44, SD = 1.80) than did 
participants in the Empathic Concern Condition (M = 2.88, SD = 1.69), t (48) = 3.15, p < 
.003. Participants in the Distress Condition also anticipated more recurring thoughts 
about the person (M = 4.40, SD = 2.14) than did participants in the Empathic Concern 
Condition (M = 2.80, SD = 1.95), t (48) = 2.76, p < .008. There was no statistically-
significant difference regarding recurring thoughts about the situation (Distress 
Condition: M = 3.56, SD = 2.12; Empathic Concern Condition: M = 3.40, SD = 1.74), t 
(48) = .39, p = .77. Results for experienced recurring thoughts showed that participants 
assigned to the Distress Condition experienced more recurring thoughts about the essay 
in general (M = 3.60, SD = 2.27) than did participants in the Empathic Concern Condition 
(M = 2.28, SD = 1.10), t (48) = 2.61, p < .01. Participants in the Distress Condition also 
experienced more recurring thoughts about the person (M = 3.36, SD = 2.16) than did 
participants in the Empathic Concern Condition (M = 2.00, SD = 1.55), t (48) = 2.56, p < 
.02. In contrast, participants in the Empathic Concern Condition experienced more 
recurring thoughts about the situation (M = 2.40, SD = 1.00) than did participants in the 
Distress Condition (M = 1.72, SD = 1.06), t (48) = 2.33, p < .02. These results are 
EMPATHY, DISTRESS, AND RECURRING THOUGHTS    26
consistent with those reported in Studies 1, 2, and 3, and offer further support for 
Hypothesis 3 regarding the foci of cognitions associated with empathic concern and 
distress. See Table 3 for more details. 
 Additional analyses. Correlational analyses on the recurring thoughts, emotion, 
and valence/arousal measures yield an interesting pattern. Regarding the emotion indices, 
the results suggest that distress, controlling for empathic concern, was significantly 
correlated with anticipated general recurring thoughts [r (48) = .28, p < .04], and 
anticipated recurring thoughts about the person [r (48) = .29, p < .03], but not with 
anticipated recurring thoughts about the situation [r (48) = -.14, p = .33]. It was also 
significantly correlated with experienced recurring thoughts in general [r (48) = .28, p < 
.05], and experienced recurring thoughts about the person [r (48) = .32, p < .02], but not 
with experienced recurring thoughts about the situation [r (48) = -.25, p = .07]. Empathic 
concern, controlling for distress, was significantly correlated only with anticipated 
recurring thoughts about the situation [r (48) = .36, p < .02]. No other correlations with 
this index were significant [all rs < .12].  
General Discussion 
 Taken together, the results of the studies reported above suggest interesting 
relations among empathic concern, distress, and both anticipated and experienced 
recurring thoughts. Specifically, using different presentation modalities, need situations, 
and victims, the results suggest that distress, but not empathic concern, is associated with 
anticipated (Study 1) and experienced (Studies 1 & 2) recurring thoughts about a victim.   
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Instead, Study 3 suggests that empathic concern is associated with anticipated 
recurring thoughts about a victim’s situation, whereas distress is associated with 
anticipated recurring thoughts about the victim per se. As noted above, one possible 
explanation for this different pattern of associations is that the motives associated with 
each emotion is different, and the focus of an observer’s thoughts pertain to those 
different goals. Although the data presented here do not speak directly to this 
explanation, we speculate that that empathy is associated with thoughts about helping the 
person to remedy the situation, whereas distress is associated with thoughts about 
escaping the victim. To our knowledge, no existing research has examined the relation 
between empathic concern, distress, and mental content about a victim or the victim’s 
situation (but for a partial examination, see Batson et al., 1988, Study 5). Further research 
is needed to better understand this important issue.  
Study 4 used a true experimental design in order to directly manipulate empathic 
concern and distress for the source of recurring thoughts. The results are consistent with 
those reported in Studies 1 through 3. Results from the affect grid in Study 4 suggest that 
there may be something deeper, and perhaps more interesting, about empathic concern 
and distress than simple valence or intensity that is causing distinct patterns of recurring 
thoughts. It is important to note these four studies employed different procedures, 
modalities, victims, need situations, and methods for assessing recurring thoughts, and 
yet the results across all four studies yield a consistent and interesting pattern of effects.   
Limitations 
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 One important limitation of the current research is that we relied on self-reports 
for both anticipated and experienced recurring thoughts. It is no simple task to peer into 
someone’s mind in order to directly assess mental content, so self-report is a natural first 
step.  Future research would benefit from using alternative methods for assessing 
recurring thoughts (e.g., reaction time measures). A second important limitation also 
contributes to the strength of the current research – the choice of victim. We purposely 
employed strangers as victims in these studies in order to avoid the effects of familiarity, 
liking, role-obligations, or other pre-existing attitudes on empathic or distress-related 
responding (for a review, see Batson, 2011). However, it could be argued that an observer 
would not be able to so easily separate distress-related and empathic emotional 
responding, or recurring thoughts, if the victim is a close other rather than a stranger. We 
agree. But we also contend that utilizing a close other as target in this type of research 
would likely conflate a number of distinct processes and, importantly, make the relations 
among distress, empathic concern, and recurring thoughts more difficult to detect. We do 
not believe employing a close other in such a manner would be fruitful in this line of 
research.   
Lastly, we made no attempt to record or analyze the specific content of recurring 
thoughts (aside from assessing the focus – person vs. situation). What participants in this 
research were specifically thinking about is not known. However, we would predict that 
distress causes escape or avoidance thoughts, whereas empathic concern causes thoughts 
about strategies to remedy the victim’s situation. We also would predict that thoughts 
associated with distress are maladaptive or unpleasant, and would likely cause negative 
attitudes toward the victim. On the other hand, we would predict that thoughts associated 
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with empathic concern are adaptive and not unpleasant, and would likely cause positive 
attitudes toward the victim (cf. Batson & Ahmad, 2009; Regan & Totten, 1975). An 
interesting line of research would involve a close examination of exactly what types of 
thoughts people have as a consequence of each type of emotion. 
Conclusions  
Why is exposure to a person in need sometimes so easy to remember and, at other 
times, so easy to forget? The answer, according to the research reported here, is that it 
depends on at least two things. First, the type of emotion that the victim elicits matters. 
Distress is associated with recurring thoughts about the other person, whereas empathic 
concern is not. Second, the type of recurring thoughts under discussion matters. Empathic 
concern is associated with recurring thoughts about the other person’s situation whereas 
distress is associated with recurring thoughts about the other person. Importantly, each of 
these vicarious emotional responses to the suffering of others has distinct motivational 
and behavioral consequences. Utilizing insight gained from the research reported here 
may help researchers or those in applied fields to develop strategies to produce the 
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Footnotes 
1. In order to ensure that empathy and personal distress were two different factors, we 
conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) with the samples from the four 
studies (n = 233). AMOS software was used to conduct the CFA using a Weighted 
Least Squares Minimum Value (WLSMV) procedure, as this seems to be the most 
appropriate for polychoric correlations (Muthén & Muthén, 1998-2012). We 
determined the fit of the model based on the goodness-of-fit indices (GOF). The GOF 
indices used in this study were: (a) The Root Mean Square Error of Approximation 
(RMSEA); (b) the Comparative Fit Index (CFI); and (c) the Tucker-Lewis Index 
(TLI). RMSEA is considered acceptable at values lower than 0.06 (Hu & Bentler, 
1999). CFI and TLI are considered to give evidence of acceptable fit at values over a 
.90 threshold (Bentler & Bonett, 1980), and excellent fit at .95 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). 
Results showed an acceptable fit, with an RMSEA of 0.079 (p (RMSEA < 0.06) > 
.05), CFI = .967, and TLI = .943). 
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We also tested the fit of a single factor model. This model did not have an acceptable fit 
(RMSEA = 0.169; CFI = .836; and TLI = .779), and was significantly worse than the 2-
factor solution (Δχ2 = 90.392, p-value < .00005). Thus, empathic concern and distress, as 
measured by the ERQ in the present research, are two separate constructs. 
2. There were no gender differences on key dependent variables in any of the four 
studies (Study 1, ts < .14, ps > .88; Study 2, ts < .49, ps > .62; Study 3, ts < 1.22, ps > 
.23; Study 4, ts < 1.32, ps > .19), so gender is not included in the reported analyses. 
3. This pattern of results for empathic concern and distress is common for victim 
scenarios in which the suffering is not particularly graphic or shocking (for a review, 
see Batson, 2011). The same pattern was found in Study 2 [empathic concern M = 
3.99, SD = 1.27; distress M = 3.48, SD = 1.42, t (59) = 3.82, p < .001] and in Study 3 
[empathic concern M = 4.30, SD = 1.31; distress M = 3.42, SD = 1.48, t (43) = 5.45, p 
< .001]. In need situations involving graphic or disturbing content (e.g., blood, 
extreme pain), the distress tends to be stronger than empathic concern (see Hoffman, 
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Table 1 
 Partial Correlations for Studies 1 and 2 
             
        Recurring Thoughts 
      Anticipated   Experienced  
Study 1 
Empathic Concern   .01 (15 mins)   N/A   
.01 (60 mins)   N/A 
Distress    .26 (15 mins)   N/A  
.27 (60 mins)   N/A 
Study 2 
Empathic Concern   -.05    -.16  
Distress    .29    .31  
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Table 2 
Partial Correlations for Study 3 
             
      Anticipated Recurring Thoughts   
              
Recurring Thoughts about the Situation 
Empathic Concern      .47     
Distress       .03     
Recurring Thoughts about the Person 
Empathic Concern      .24     
Distress       .44    
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Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations for Study 4 
             
       Condition     
        Empathic Concern  Distress   
Empathic Concern   5.79 (2.48)   4.75 (1.69)  
Distress    2.66 (1.80)   3.88 (2.16) 
Anticipated Thoughts (General) 2.88 (1.69)   4.44 (1.80)   
Anticipated Thoughts (Person) 2.80 (1.95)   4.40 (2.14) 
Anticipated Thoughts (Situation) 3.40 (1.73)   3.56 (2.12) 
Experienced Thoughts (General) 2.28 (1.10)   3.60 (2.27) 
Experienced Thoughts (Person) 2.00 (1.55)   3.36 (2.16) 
Experienced Thoughts (Situation) 2.40 (1.00)   1.72 (1.06) 
Valence    -.76 (2.11)   -.40 (1.80) 
Arousal    -.08 (1.99)   -.28 (2.07) 
             
Note: Numbers in bold in the same row are significantly different at p < .05. 
